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Abstract
This paper identies a causal link between changes in product market competition, rm
reorganization and within-rm wage inequality. We exploit a unique episode of comprehens-
ive rm entry deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment and use exceptionally detailed
linked employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms and workers. We nd
that following deregulation a¤ected rms atten their hierarchies: the number of layers is
reduced and managersspans of control increased. Dropping a hierarchy layer is accompan-
ied by a signicant reduction in wage inequality within the rm, by 10% for the average
pay ratio between the top and the bottom layer, showing that there are real changes arising
from rm reorganization. Overall dispersion is also reduced. We discuss mechanisms and
interpretations for these changes.
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The production of any good requires time, knowledge, and collaboration between individuals
and teams. Recent theories have focussed on organizations taking the form of "knowledge
hierarchies", where production workers deal with routine tasks and experts specialize on giving
directions to solve more complex problems.1 The organizational choice for a rm is to determine
the structure of the hierarchy, given by the number of layers of increasing knowledge and the
span of control of experts. Firms tend to change the organization of production in response
to shocks, such as deregulation and international trade. Increased competition and uncertainty
may induce rms to signicantly change their hierarchical structure. The restructuring is then
expected to a¤ect wage inequality within rms, as knowledge requirements change across the
hierarchy.
Recent research has emphasized the role of hierarchies and organizational practises in ex-
plaining rm growth and productivity, and the distribution of wages (e.g., Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2006; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Caliendo et al., 2015). However, there
is still limited evidence on what causes rm reorganization, and particularly how competition
shocks a¤ect within-rm wage inequality as rms adjust by re-organizing production.
This paper studies how increased domestic product market competition induces rms to
change their internal organization and how this change a¤ects wage inequality. We investigate
the e¤ect of entry deregulation on the structure of a rms hierarchy, particularly the number
of layers and the average span of control of managers. We also study how these changes a¤ect
the distribution of wages within the rm and wage inequality. An important contribution of our
paper is to identify a causal link between changes in competition in the domestic product market
and rmsorganizational change and wage inequality. To do so, we exploit a unique episode
of comprehensive rm entry deregulation across industries as a quasi-natural experiment, and
use exceptionally detailed employer-employee linked data for the universe of private sector rms
and all of their workers.
Our main ndings are that increased domestic competition leads rms to atten their hier-
archies: they reduce the number of layers and increase managersspans of control. In addition,
wage inequality between managers and workers decreases, and the pay and career transitions
of individual workers are also a¤ected, showing that there are real changes arising from rm
reorganization.
To identify the causal e¤ect of increasing domestic competition on organizational change and
inequality, we exploit an exogenous change in entry barriers. We use the On the Spot Firm
program, implemented in Portugal from 2005 to simplify business registration, as a natural
experiment. The program created government o¢ ces (one-stop shops) where entrepreneurs
1See, e.g., Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2015)
provide a review of the literature on knowledge-based hierarchies.
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can register a new rm in a single visit, while prior to the reform it took 78 days on average,
and the requirement to complete numerous procedures and forms, involving visits to several
di¤erent public o¢ ces. The the fees were also reduced from 13.5 to 3% of GDP per capita in
the On the Spot Firmo¢ ces. The reform was implemented in di¤erent municipalities over
time randomly, and by the end of 2009, 164 municipalities had a one-stop shop, as shown in
Figure 1. The initiative was hugely successful, resulting in a signicant increase in rm entry.
Portugal is now among the countries where starting-up a business is fastest in the world.2
We use the roll out of the On the Spot Firmprogram, the cross municipality-time variation
in adoption, to cleanly identify the e¤ect of increased competition on rmscorporate hierarchies
and pay structure. To study rms internal organization and wages, we use comprehensive
employer-employee linked data, which tracks each rm and each employee over time. The data
has unusually rich and detailed information on workers characteristics, such as gender, age,
education, skill level, occupation, experience, type of contract of employment, hours of work
and earnings. We measure changes in organization using hierarchical occupations to dene
four layers of increasing knowledge and responsibility in the rm, following recent literature
(e.g., Caliendo et al., 2015). The data also has information on the rms industry, location,
employment, number of establishments, sales volume, and legal and ownership structures.
Theories of knowledge-based and incentive-based hierarchies emphasize a positive relation-
ship between production scale and the optimal number of layers (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg,
2012; Chen, 2017). An additional management layer is costly but it reduces marginal costs
as worker productivity increases, through problem solving assistance or increased monitoring,
respectively. Thus, adding a layer is protable if the rmsproduction increases su¢ ciently.
Similarly, a reduction in production scale may induce rms to drop layers. Since the On the
Spot Firm program reduced entry barriers, as new rms enter the market, it is anticipated
that rm-level output and sales decrease. This could induce rms to reorganize production.3
We show that the reform signicantly increased rm entry within industries and municipal-
ities and it reduced rm-level sales and output of a¤ected incumbents. We nd that after the
reform rms changed the structure of the hierarchy. In particular, our estimates show that the
depth of the hierarchy, measured by the number of layers, is signicantly reduced and the span
of control of top and middle managers increased after the On the Spot Firm. The e¤ects are
largest for rms with three and four layers prior to the reform. In particular, top-managers
spans increased by 18 and 12% respectively, relative to the sample means. The data that we
2As a result of the On the Spot Firm, Portugal rose from 113th to 26th in the World Bank Ease of Doing
Businessranking of countries and was considered top reformer in business entry in the Doing Business report.
3Knowledge-based hierarchy models also emphasize the trade-o¤ between having more layers to economize on
knowledge acquisition but experiencing higher communication costs, and having fewer layers but higher costs of
knowledge acquisition. Increased product market competition may induce rms to add layers to screen problems.
On the other hand, more layers may slow down the speed of communication and response times. Whether
competition induces rms to become atter is an empirical question that we shed light on.
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use allow us to obtain estimates that control for observed rm characteristics, as well as for
unobserved rm specic heterogeneity. The fact that adoption of the reform varied across mu-
nicipalities and time allows us to control for municipality-specic and time-specic e¤ects in
our specications. Our ndings show that the increased rm entry induced by the reform led
to organizational restructuring by rms, reducing the depth and increasing the span of the
hierarchy.
We nd that wage inequality decreased after the reform for a¤ected rms. In particular, the
reduction in hierarchical layers is accompanied by a 10% reduction in the ratio of average pay of
the top to the bottom layer within rms, and 12% across rms, relative to the sample average
ratio. We also estimate a 9% reduction in the 90-10 percentile ratio and a 6% decrease in the
90-50 wage gap within the a¤ected rms that reorganize. These results are consistent with
knowledge-based and incentive-based hierarchy theories, where reducing the number of layers
in the hierarchy a¤ects the wage distribution and inequality as the distribution of knowledge
and incentives change across the organization.
Finally, we assess individual-level pay and career transitions, before and after the reform,
to paint a more detailed picture of rms changes in organizational and wage structures in
response to the policy change. We nd that workers in all layers are more likely to exit the
a¤ected rms and are less likely to be promoted, within the rm or across rms. Individuals
in top management are also more likely to be demoted, e.g., to a position in the middle-
manager layer. The attening of rmshierarchies induced by the reform can therefore have
lasting consequences on the career paths of individual workers. Consistent with higher spans of
control, individual pay of top and middle managers increased after the reform, controlling for
observed and unobserved workersskills. This suggests increased decision-making by top and
middle managers (Athey and Roberts, 2001; Prendergast, 2002). The pay of workers in the
bottom layer is also found to have increased.
Our results are related to Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), who show that competition from in-
ternational trade liberalization, following the Canada-US free trade agreement, leads to atter
rm hierarchies. Our analysis focusses on increased domestic competition, from an exogen-
ous shock to entry barriers. As such, we provide independent evidence of the importance of
greater product market competition on rm reorganization. Additionally, our detailed employer-
employee data allows us to go further in investigating the real e¤ects of organizational change
following a competition shock, particularly the distribution of wages within the rm as well as
individual pay and career advancement. In that respect, our paper is related to recent research
by Friedrich (2020), who uses data for Danish rms to show that trade shocks a¤ect wage
inequality through changes in rm hierarchies. We present new evidence of a causal e¤ect of
increased domestic rm entry following entry deregulation on rm organizational restructuring
and reduction in within-rm wage inequality.
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Our paper also contributes to the literature that has used theories of knowledge-based hier-
archies to understand economic phenomena such as rm productivity, wage inequality, and the
gains from trade liberalization (e.g., Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). Caliendo et al. (2015)
show that reorganization within French rms, through changes in hierarchical layers of work-
ers, is important to understand how rms grow and contract and the evolution of wages and
employment in each layer, as predicted by the theory. A related literature focusses on incentive-
based hierarchies, where supervisors, in higher layers, incentivize workers to exert more e¤ort
by increased monitoring of subordinates (see Chen, 2017; Chen and Suen, 2019).
Previous studies investigate the e¤ect of product market and entry regulation on labor
market outcomes. Notably, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) show that entry regulation in the
retail sector increased retailer concentration and slowed down employment growth in France.
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) develop a macroeconomic model to study distribution e¤ects of
product and labor market deregulation; the entry of new rms reduces mark-ups thus increas-
ing the probability of unemployment for workers employed in incumbent rms, even if overall
unemployment falls. Finally, our paper contributes more generally to a literature on within-rm
wage inequality. Mueller et al. (2017) show that rms with higher pay inequality between top-
and bottom-level jobs have higher valuations and stronger operating performance. Song et al.
(2019) document the rise in earnings inequality between workers in the US and show that the
rise in within-rm inequality occurred mostly within large rms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the On the Spot
Firm quasi-natural experiment. Section 3 describes the data used and presents descriptive
statistics. Section 4 documents stylized facts about the relationship between rm scale, organ-
ization and wage inequality. In section 5 we outline the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents
and discusses the results on the e¤ect of the policy change on rm creation, production scale,
changes in the rm hierarchical structure as well as on wage inequality within the rm. The
last section concludes.
2 Natural experiment for product market competition: the On
the Spot Firmreform
In this section we describe the natural experiment for product market changes that we exploit
in this paper: the On the Spot Firmreform. In March 2005 a new elected government took
o¢ ce in Portugal, and in the following May, the government introduced the On the Spot
Firmprogram to reform business registration and reduce the cost and bureaucracy of starting
a rm. The objective was to encourage national and foreign investment. Prior to the reform,
to register a new rm in Portugal, an entrepreneur had to visit multiple separate public o¢ ces,
of the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Economy and Labor and Social Security, to obtain the
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necessary documents and approvals, and was required to complete 20 forms and 11 procedures.
The process took on average 78 days and the fees were equivalent to 13.5% of GDP per capita.
In May 2005, the Ministry of Justice announced the On the Spot Firmprogram (Empresa
na Hora), which was coordinated by the newly created Agency for Administrative Moderniz-
ation.4 The program was implemented in cooperation with various ministries to improve the
e¢ ciency of public services and reduce the red tape associated with setting up a new rm. The
program makes it possible to register a company in a single o¢ ce a one-stop shop in a
single visit. The entrepreneurs no longer need to obtain in advance a certicate of company
admissibility from the National Registry of Companies or to sign a public deed. During the
simplied process, the company identication card and social security number are handed over,
and the company receives its memorandum and articles of association, as well as an extract of
the entry in the Commercial Register. All of the details are then sent to the tax authorities.5
The business registration reform was unannounced and unanticipated. The program intro-
duced the one-stop shops, which are non-prot seeking government o¢ ces, where entrepreneurs
can register a company at a single o¢ ce desk in less than an hour. The fees were reduced to 3%
of GDP per capita, below the OECD average of 6.8%.6 Resource constraints and uncertainty
about its success meant that the On the Spot Firmwas not introduced simultaneously in
all municipalities. In July 2005 four pilot one-stop shops were opened in the municipalities of
Coimbra, Aveiro, Barreiro and Moita.7 The program was then expanded over time to municip-
alities across the country. By the end of 2009, 164 municipalities had a one-stop shop. Figure 1
shows the geographical dispersion and opening dates of the one-stop shops across Portugal. As
the Figure shows, the program was progressively rolled-out randomly across municipalities over
time. Our analysis exploits this cross-municipality-time-specic variation in the implementation
of the On the Spot Firmprogram to identify the e¤ect of the resulting increase in competition
on rmsinternal organization.8
The policy was very successful in simplifying business registration. After the reform, the
average number of days, procedures, o¢ ce visits and costs in fees were signicantly reduced
for entrepreneurs. The reform also signicantly increased the number of new rms created.
Portugal is now one of the fastest countries in the world in starting-up a business, and was
4http://www.empresanahora.mj.pt/ENH/sections/EN_homepage.html
5State-owned rms or rms in industries with industry-specic requirements or permits are not allowed to be
registered in the one-stop shops of the On the Spot Firmprogram. These are mainly in the nance, insurance
and transportation sectors. We exclude observations in these industries from our analysis.
6World Bank (2006).
7Administratively, Portugal is divided into 308 municipalities which are the seat of local administrative and
executive power.
8 In previous work we discuss further the exogenous nature of the reform and its implementation, and the
fact that the rollout of the program is unrelated with the political a¢ liation of the municipality chief executive.
We also show that there are no statistically signicant pre-reform di¤erences in rm entry and other economic
outcomes between municipalities that introduce the policy in the rst two years and those that do so in subsequent
years, supporting our identication (Fernandes et al., 2014, 2018).
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considered top reformer in business entry in the World Bank Doing Business report.
3 Data description
The main dataset used in this paper is the Portuguese longitudinal linked employer-employee
data Quadros de Pessoal (QP), which covers virtually the universe of private sector rms and
all of their employees. The data are collected annually, since 1985, by the Portuguese Ministry
of Labor and Social Solidarity. Response to the survey is legally mandatory for all private
sector rms with at least one registered employee, and the survey has to be publicly available
for consultation. Those two requirements ensure coverage and accuracy of the data. Each rm
and each worker are assigned a unique identication number in the data, and can therefore be
traced over time. The reference month for the data is October since 1994.
The data has comprehensive and uniquely detailed information on rms and workers, in-
cluding the rms employment, sales volume, industry, location, number of establishments, age,
legal structure and ownership structure (equity breakdown among domestic private, public or
foreign). Worker-level information includes demographic characteristics, such as gender, age,
level of education, and level of qualication; job characteristics, including occupation, type of
contract of employment, job tenure, promotions, hours of work, and components of compensa-
tion: wage, seniority payments, regular and irregular benets and overtime pay.
Importantly for our analysis, in addition to the workersoccupation (according to the Inter-
national Standard Classication of Occupations, ISCO), it is also mandatory to classify workers
in levels of qualication, which are dened by Law. These levels categorize workers according
to the complexity, responsibility and skill requirement of the tasks they perform, and reect
layers of increasing knowledge and skills within the rm.9 We use this information on the level
of qualication of each worker to dene four hierarchical layers in the rm: layer 3 includes
"Top executives (top management)", layer 2 includes "Intermediary executives (middle man-
agement)" and "Supervisors and team leaders"; layer 1 includes "Higher-skilled professionals"
and some "Skilled professionals";10 and layer 0 the remaining workers, including some "Skilled
professionals", "Semi-skilled professionals", "Non-skilled professionals" and "Apprentices, in-
terns and trainees", these categories are typically production workers.
9The eight levels of qualication dened in the Law Decree no. 121/78 of July are the following: 1 Top
executives (top management); 2 Intermediary executives (middle management); 3 Supervisors, team leaders
and foremen; 4 Higher-skilled professionals; 5 Skilled professionals; 6 Semi-skilled professionals; 7 Non-
skilled professionals; 8 Apprentices, interns and trainees. Appendix Table A.1 describes in detail the hierarchical
levels and their skill content in accordance with the law; see also Fernandes et al. (2014).
10We include in layer 1 "Skilled professionals" with average pay larger or equal to the median pay of "Higher-
skilled professionals".
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Our analysis covers the period from 2002 to 2009 and includes manufacturing and ser-
vices rms (46 industries at the 2-digit SIC classication). The full employer-employee sample
includes 433,384 distinct rms (contributing with 1,846,277 rm-year observations) over the
period.11 To study the e¤ect of increased product market competition on rm organization, we
will focus on several outcomes: the number of hierarchical layers within the rm, the average
span of control of managers and other top layers, layer-level employment, and measures of wage
inequality within the rm. We also assess the e¤ect of the reform on rm production scale,
measured by the rms sales volume, output and employment.
For the results on workerscompensation, we obtain the workers monthly pay by summing
the monthly base pay (wage for the normal hours of work), tenure related payments, and regular,
irregular, and extraordinary benets. The monthly pay is deated to obtain real pay. We then
obtain each workers (real) hourly pay by dividing the (real) monthly pay by total hours of
work.
Our specications control for observable rm characteristic including the rms size, age,
ownership type (private, public or foreign), whether the rm is multi-plant and whether the
rm is an exporter. Information on exporters is obtained by merging the employer-employee
data with data from the International Trade data set collected by the Portuguese National
Institute of Statistics. We also account for industry and municipality unobserved heterogeneity
and for aggregate shocks, common to all rms. Table 1 reports summary statistics of rm-
level variables, for the full sample as well as by rmsnumber of layers prior to the reform.
Individual-level specications control for observed workerscharacteristics, gender, age, tenure,
education, and type of contract, as well as for unobserved heterogeneity.
11The nal estimation sample is smaller due to missing data for some variables.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
All rms Pre-reform number of layers:
1 layer 2 layers 3 layers 4 layers
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(real sales) 11.989 11.379 12.152 13.183 14.636
ln(employment) 1.321 0.765 1.502 2.265 3.412
ln(hourly pay) 1.156 1.097 1.161 1.278 1.365
No. of Layers 1.766 1.186 1.960 2.730 3.633
ln(employment)
Layer 3 0.329 0.200 0.264 0.405 0.891
Layer 2 0.491 0.167 0.248 0.474 1.161
Layer 1 0.787 0.266 0.445 0.813 1.684
Layer 0 0.948 0.563 0.942 1.523 2.533
ln(mean hourly pay)
Layer 3 1.965 1.579 1.698 2.057 2.419
Layer 2 1.703 1.432 1.539 1.753 1.987
Layer 1 1.760 1.660 1.711 1.775 1.885
Layer 0 1.113 1.043 1.118 1.240 1.344
Span of control (empl layer below/layer)
Layer 3 2.192 - 2.261 2.115 2.286
Layer 2 3.514 - 3.283 3.807 3.465
Layer 1 4.743 - 3.530 4.574 6.418
Top-bottom-layer hourly pay ratio 1.538 - 1.500 2.081 3.104
Standard deviation of hourly pay 1.893 - 1.590 2.604 4.237
90-10 hourly pay ratio 1.739 - 1.864 2.533 2.941
90-50 hourly pay ratio 1.388 - 1.465 1.799 1.998
Own calculations based on Portugals LEED, MTSS (2002-2009). The table reports averages of the variables.
4 Stylized facts: Firm scale, organization and wage inequality
In both knowledge-based and incentive-based hierarchy models, the optimal number of layers
is positively related to production scale (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Chen, 2017).
Adding a layer of management is costly but it reduces marginal costs by increasing workers
productivity, through either more problem solving or more intensive monitoring, respectively.
As a result, adding a layer is protable if the rmsproduction increases su¢ ciently. Similarly,
a reduction in rm scale may induce rms to drop a hierarchical layer. Since the On the Spot
Firmprogram we analyze implies an increase in competition through a reduction in barriers to
rm entry, as new rms enter the market rm-level output and sales are expected to decrease,
potentially inducing rms to reduce the number of layers.
Therefore, in this section, we start by presenting stylized facts to document the relationship
between rm sales and the number of hierarchy layers, and between the number of layers and
pay inequality in our data. This motivates the main analysis of the paper that uses the On the
Spot Firmreform as a quasi-natural experiment to study how competition through a reduction
in entry costs a¤ects rm organization and wage inequality. Figure 2 starts by presenting in the
left panel the rm size distribution in the data, according to the number of hierarchical layers
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in the rm. It shows clear evidence that rms with a larger number of layers have higher sales.
This is consistent with the summary statistics for log rm sales presented in Table 1. The right
panel of Figure 2 shows that there is a positive relationship between the number of layers in the
rm and the gap between average pay of workers in the top and of those in the bottom layer,
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Figure 2: Distribution of sales and pay inequality by rmsnumber of layers
To complement the evidence from Figure 2 and empirically document the relationship
between rm scale, hierarchy and inequality at the micro level, controlling for rm observable
and unobservable characteristics, we present regression results relating to those relationships.
Table 2 documents the relation between production scale and the number of layers. We estimate
the following equation:
layersjt =   ln(salesjt) +   layersj;t 1 + dt + dj + jt (1)
The dependent variable is the number of layers in the rm. We control for the number of layers
in the previous period, layersj;t 1, to account for the e¤ect of previous organizational structure
on current scale and organization. We include rm xed e¤ects (dj) in odd-number columns and
municipality (dm) and industry (ds) xed e¤ects in even-number columns, and always control
for time e¤ects (dt), to absorb aggregate shocks that a¤ect all rms. As expected, according
to the theory, the coe¢ cient estimate of  is positive and statistically signicant across all
specications, conrming that there is a positive correlation between rm sales and hierarchy.
This is consistent with the cross-sectional evidence from Figure 2.
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Table 2: Firm production scale and hierarchy
Dependent variable: Layerst
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(salest) 0.100*** 0.359*** 0.080*** 0.108***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Layerst 1 0.161*** 0.715***
(0.002) (0.002)
Firm xed e¤ects yes yes
Municipality xed e¤ects yes yes
Industry xed e¤ects yes yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
R2 0.014 0.402 0.038 0.703
No. Obs. 1,620,350 1,620,350 1,326,948 1,326,948
The dependent variable is the number of layers in the rm. Observations are by rm-year.
Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3 presents estimates for the correlation between rm hierarchy and pay inequality
within the rm:
ln inequaljt =   layersjt + dt + dj + jt (2)
The dependent variable, pay inequality, is measured by the ratio of average pay of the top layer
to average pay of the bottom layer in the rm; alternatively, we use the standard deviation of
hourly pay as a measure of dispersion at the rm-year level. The results in columns (1) and (2)
of Table 3, conrm that a higher number of layers is associated with increased inequality, within
and across rms, consistent with the graphical evidence from Figure 2. It is important to note
that this relationship is not mechanical, since we measure rm organization, the hierarchical
layers in the rm, based on workersoccupations. We still nd that reorganizing by adding
(dropping) layers is accompanied by an increase (decrease) in pay inequality. An additional
layer is associated with a 35% higher top-to-bottom wage ratio, relative to the sample average.
We also nd that within industries and municipalities, rms with more layers have higher pay
inequality. Columns (3) and (4) show that more hierarchy layers are also associated with higher
overall pay dispersion both within rms and across rms in an industry and municipality. The
facts presented in this section are consistent with evidence for Danish rms (see Friedrich, 2020).
In the following sections, we use the reform as an exogenous shock to product market
competition, and assess its e¤ects on rmsproduction scale, organization and pay structure.
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Table 3: Firm hierarchy and wage inequality
Dependent variable: top-bottom pay ratio std. dev.(hourly pay)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Layerst 0.540*** 0.673*** 0.569*** 0.878***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.035)
Firm xed e¤ects yes yes
Municipality xed e¤ects yes yes
Industry xed e¤ects yes yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
R2 0.016 0.137 0.002 0.023
No. Obs. 1,090,124 1,090,124 1,088,657 1,088,657
The dependent variable is pay inequality, measured by the ratio of average pay of the
top to the bottom layer in columns (1)-(2) and by the standard deviation of hourly pay
in columns (3)-(4). Observations are by rm-year. Robust standard errors, clustered by
municipality are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
5 Identication strategy
To identify the e¤ects of increased product market competition on rms internal organization
and pay structure, we use the On the Spot Firmprogram as a quasi-natural experiment. We
exploit the roll-out of the program across municipalities over time as an exogenous source of
increased rm entry, thus estimating the e¤ects from variation in the timing of the policy change
across municipalities. We therefore obtain di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates. The variable of
main interest in our specications is the reform variable, OTSFmt, which takes the value 1 in
all periods since the program is adopted in municipality m, and 0 otherwise. We include the
variable lagged by one year.12 Firms and individuals in municipalities that introduce the On
the Spot Firmprogram are the treatment group.
In our specications, among a host of factors that may a¤ect the variables of interest, we
include municipality xed e¤ects, which absorb any potential unobservable di¤erences across
municipalities. In addition, we also estimate treatment e¤ects in each year, prior to the reform
and after its introduction, to conrm the assumption that the shock was unanticipated. The
main empirical specication that we estimate is the following reduced form:
yjsmt =  OTSFm;t 1 +   Zjt + dt + dj + jmst (3)
The dependent variable yjsmt is one of the organizational measures, such as the number of
layers, span of control, and wage inequality, for rm j, industry s, municipality m and year t.
Zjt includes rm characteristics, such as size, whether the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-
establishment, ownership type, and age. We control for time e¤ects, dt, and for rm xed e¤ects,
12Some municipalities introduce additional one-stop shops in subsequent years. The treatment dummy variable
is set to one when the municipality adopts the policy, that is, when the rst On the Spot Firmo¢ ce is opened.
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dj , or alternatively for industry, ds, and municipality, dm, xed e¤ects. This is a di¤erence-in-
di¤erences specication, where the coe¢ cient of main interest, , on the reform dummy variable,
captures the di¤erential e¤ect of the policy for rms and workers in municipalities that adopt
the On the Spot Firm. jmst is a white noise disturbance term. We cluster the standard
errors at the municipality level, at which the policy was introduced.
We also estimate specications at the worker-level, to assess whether changes in hierarchy
and span of control are accompanied by changes in individuals outcomes in a¤ected rms after




1l  (OTSFm;t 1  layerpre-spot=l;i) +
3P
l=0
2l  layerpre-spot=l;i +
 Xit +   Zjt + dt + di + dj + ijsmt (4)
Here, the dependent variable is one of the individual outcomes: natural log of real hourly pay
of worker i in rm j, industry s, municipality m in year t, probability of exit from the rm,
probability of demotion or probability of promotion. As above, OTSFm;t 1 is the reform treat-
ment variable. We estimate separate e¤ects according to the layer the worker was in prior to
the reform; layerpre-spot=l;i is a vector of dummy variables for whether the worker was in layer
l (where l=3 is a top executive and l=0 a production worker). Xit includes individual charac-
teristics, tenure and age and their squares, gender, level of education, and type of employment
contract. Firm characteristics are included in Zjt, as discussed above.
We continue to control for year (dt) as well as rm (dj), or industry (ds) and municipality
(dm), xed e¤ects. In addition, we also include worker or worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects, di
and dij , respectively, in the compensation regressions. Therefore, this specication accounts
for individual observed skills and unobserved heterogeneity in the structure of compensation.
The coe¢ cients of main interest in this specication are those in vector 1l, on the interaction
terms between the reform variable and the indicators for the occupational layer of the worker
prior to the reform. Each element captures the di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on the hourly
pay of top-managers, middle-managers, higher-skilled professionals and other workers in treated
municipalities. In the next sections we assess the e¤ect of our quasi-natural experiment on the
rmsorganizational and pay structure.
6 Empirical results
6.1 E¤ect of the On the Spot Firmreform on rm entry
Before we assess the rmsorganizational response to the product market changes following the
On the Spot Firm, in this section we start by showing that the reform led to signicant changes
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in rm entry, and thus contributed to increase product market competition. In particular,
this conrms the use of the exogenous competitive shock to investigate how rms adapted
by changing their hierarchical structure. We estimate a specication for the number of new
entrants, over the period of analysis, 2002 to 2009:
entrymst =  OTSFm;t 1 + dm + ds + dt + mst (5)
The dependent variable, entrymst, is the number of new rms in a municipality, industry
and year (mst). OTSFm;t 1 is the On the Spot Firm policy variable, as described in the
previous section. dt are year dummies, which account for aggregate shocks, common to all
municipalities, and dm are municipality xed e¤ects, which absorb any permanent di¤erences
across municipalities in rm entry, in particular between municipalities that adopt the policy
and those that do not. We also include industry xed e¤ects, ds, to account for time-invariant
industry characteristics that may be related to entry. mst is an error term. Standard errors
are clustered by municipality.
Table 4: E¤ect of the "On the Spot Firm" program on rm entry
Dependent variable: No. new rms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OTSF reform 0.670*** 0.624*** 0.100*** 0.095***
(0.201) (0.199) (0.020) (0.021)
Marginal E¤ect 0.248*** 0.242***
(0.050) (0.055)
Municipality xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Year xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.126 0.344 0.061 0.291
No. Obs. 56,257 56,257 56,257 56,257
The dependent variable is the number of new rms. The OTSF variable, for
municipality-years with "On the Spot Firm" one-stop shops, is lagged one year.
Columns (1) and (2) report estimates from an OLS specication. Columns (3) and
(4) report estimates from a Negative Binomial specication. Observations are by
municipality-industry-year. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality are re-
ported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The coe¢ cient of interest, , captures the di¤erential e¤ect of the On the Spot Firm
reform on rm entry in a¤ected municipalities, relative to other municipalities. We expect  to
be positive if the reform induced higher rm entry in a¤ected municipalities. Table 4 reports
the results. In columns (1) and (2) we estimate a linear model for the number of entrants, while
in columns (3) and (4) we estimate a negative binomial specication for the same variable.
Odd-number columns include municipality and year xed e¤ects, while even-number columns
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additionally include industry xed e¤ects.
We nd that the On the Spot Firmreform is associated with increased rm entry within
municipalities and industries. The coe¢ cient on the reform variable, OTSFm;t 1, is positive and
statistically signicant at the 1% level for both the linear and the negative binomial results. The
linear estimates imply a 25% increase in the number of entrants within a municipality-industry,
relative to average entry in the sample (column 2). This result shows that the policy change is
associated with a economically signicant increase in entry, and therefore competition.13
In Table 4 above, we obtain the average e¤ect of the policy on rm entry over the post-reform
period. Next, we also provide event study evidence, estimating the e¤ects in each year.14 This
assesses whether the e¤ects vary with the duration of the program and, importantly, conrms
our identication strategy that the introduction of one-stop shops in particular municipalities
and time periods is not correlated with prior trends. To that end, we run the following event-




 OTSFm;t= + dm + ds + dt + mst (6)
We continue to include the same sets of xed e¤ects. This specication includes a set of
dummy variables for each lead and lag, with regard to the year of adoption in a municipality,
OTSFm;t= . This estimates the e¤ects over time, relative to the year prior to the adoption of
the policy, which is the reference year.15 In Figure 3, we plot out the estimated coe¢ cients 
over time, relative to t   1, and 95% condence bands. The results show that the coe¢ cients
are statistically insignicant in the lead years, prior to the On the Spot Firm, conrming that
there are no anticipatory e¤ects and supporting our identication strategy. The coe¢ cients
become positive and statistically signicant in the years after the adoption of the policy and
they also increase over time, with an increase in rm entry in a¤ected municipalities.
13This conrms our nding in previous work (Fernandes et al., 2014, 2018). Consistent results on increased
rm entry following deregulation are reported by Bruhn (2011) for a similar reform in Mexico.
14Our setup is a staggered adoption design (see Athey and Imbens, 2018), but we use the term event study
as is common in the applied literature.
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Figure 3: E¤ect of the On the Spot Firmprogram on rm entry over time
6.2 Firm production scale and the On the Spot FirmProgram
We have documented stylized facts in section 4 of a positive correlation between rm scale and
hierarchy and between hierarchical structure and inequality. In this section, we investigate the
e¤ects of increased entry following the On the Spot Firm reform on rm production scale,
as a motivation for the subsequent analysis that establishes a causal link between competition
and rm reorganization and wage inequality. We assess whether the competition shock a¤ected
rm production scale, thereby inducing rms to reorganize, and in turn changing inequality, as
predicted by the theory.
We use the On the Spot Firmprogram as a natural experiment and estimate Equation
(3) for the (ln) of sales, employment and output of incumbent rms as the dependent variables.
Table 5 presents the results. We nd that increased rm entry following the reform is associ-
ated with a signicant reduction in sales, output and employment within rms (odd-number
columns), as well as across rms in an industry and municipality (even-number columns). These
ndings are consistent with theoretical results that lowering entry barriers leads to a fall in rm-
level output and sales, with the entry of new rms.
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Table 5: Competition and rm size
Dependent variable: ln(sales) ln(employment) ln(output)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OTSF reform -0.027*** -0.116*** -0.032*** -0.107*** -0.024*** -0.105***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015)
Firm xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Municipality xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Industry xed e¤ects yes yes yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.016 0.371 0.037 0.342 0.013 0.400
No. obs. 1,214,951 1,214,951 1,214,951 1,214,951 680,012 680,012
The dependent variable is the natural log of rm sales volume in real terms in columns (1)-(2), the natural log rm
employment in columns (3)-(4), and the naural log of output in columns (5)-(6). The OTSF variable is lagged one year.
Odd-numbered columns include rm and year xed e¤ects while even-numbered columns include industry, municipality
and year xed e¤ects. Other covariates include whether the rm is an exporter, whether multi-establishment, ownership,
and age. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, are reported in parentheses. Observations are at the rm-
year level. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
In sum, this section shows that following the reform, rm sales and output decrease. The
reduction in production scale may be a channel inducing rms to drop hierarchy layers, as
predicted by knowledge-based hierarchy theories. In the next section, we investigate how the
reform a¤ects rmshierarchies and pay inequality.
6.3 The On the Spot Firmreform, rm hierarchies and wage inequality
In this section we present the main results of the paper, on the e¤ects of increased entry and
competition following the On the Spot Firmpolicy on rmsinternal organization and wage
structure, particularly pay inequality between the top and the bottom layers of the hierarchy.
In Table 6, we start by investigating the e¤ect of the entry deregulation on the depth of the
hierarchy, measured as the number of hierarchy layers in the rm. We estimate Equation (3),
with the number of layers (columns 1 and 2), or the log number of layers (columns 3 and 4), as
the dependent variable. This analysis excludes rms with just one layer prior to the reform, since
it is not possible to measure spans of control and inequality across layers, in subsequent sections.
The top panel of Table 6 uses the full sample of rms. We include rm and year xed e¤ects in
columns (1) and (3), thus estimating the e¤ects accounting for rmsunobserved idiosyncractic
characteristics that may a¤ect the hierarchy, as well as for aggregate trends. The estimated
coe¢ cients on the reform dummy variable, OTSFm;t 1, show that the increased competition
led to a signicant reduction in the number of layers within rms in a¤ected municipalities,
by 0.08 or 5%, relative to other rms. The e¤ects are larger when municipality and industry
xed e¤ects are included, corresponding to a 10% reduction in layers (columns 2 and 4). These
ndings provide evidence that the entry reform induced rms to atten their hierarchies.
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Table 6: Competition and the number of hierarchical layers
Dependent variable: No. of Layers ln(No. of Layers)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All rms
OTSF reform -0.080*** -0.163*** -0.053*** -0.102***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.004) (0.008)
R2 0.010 0.252 0.010 0.223
No. obs. 1,386,328 1,386,328 1,386,328 1,386,328
Layers pre-reform = 2
OTSF reform -0.059*** -0.047*** -0.072*** -0.065***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
R2 0.007 0.029 0.014 0.027
No. obs. 375,224 375,224 375,224 375,224
Layers pre-reform = 3
OTSF reform -0.271*** -0.265*** -0.138*** -0.135***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
R2 0.044 0.079 0.052 0.077
No. obs. 162,126 162,126 162,126 162,126
Layers pre-reform = 4
OTSF reform -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.119*** -0.118***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006)
R2 0.081 0.139 0.071 0.122
No. obs. 77,896 77,896 77,896 77,896
The dependent variable is the number of hierarchical layers in columns (1)-(2) and the
natural log of the number of layers in columns (3)-(4). The OTSF variable is lagged one
year. Columns (1) and (3) include rm and year xed e¤ects and columns (2) and (4)
include industry, municipality and year xed e¤ects. Other covariates include whether
the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-establishment, ownership, and age. Robust
standard errors, clustered by municipality, are reported in parentheses. Observations
are at the rm-year level. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
In the top panel of Table 6, we estimate average treatment e¤ects for the post-reform
period, relative to the pre-reform period. We now present event study evidence of the e¤ects
of the reform on rmsdelayering. We estimate a specication similar to Equation (6) above,
for the number of layers at the rm-year level as the dependent variable. Figure 4 plots the
point estimates of the coe¢ cients  over time, relative to the year prior to the policy in
each municipality, as the reference year, and 95% condence bands. The event graph shows
a structural break after the introduction of the On the Spot Firmpolicy, with a signicant
reduction in the number of layers for rms in a¤ected municipalities, from period t+1 onwards.
The coe¢ cients are insignicant prior to the reform, showing that there are no pretrends,
and supporting the identication assumption that the policy was unanticipated. Markedly,
comparing the results in Figure 4 with those in Figure 3 above, for rm entry, the timing of
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the drop in the number of hierarchy layers is consistent with that for the increase in rm entry
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Figure 4: E¤ect of the On the Spot Firmprogram on the number of layers over time
The results in the top panel of Table 6, discussed above, are for the full sample, whilst in
subsequent panels, we estimate the e¤ects separately according to rmsinitial number of layers,
in the year prior to the reform. For all samples, we nd that rms in a¤ected municipalities
reduce the number of hierarchy layers after the reform. The e¤ects are larger for rms with
initially three or four layers, with a signicant 0.27 and 0.35 reduction in layers within rms,
respectively, representing a 10% decrease relative to the sample averages. The results remain
similar with municipality and industry xed e¤ects.
Having discussed the e¤ects on the depth of the hierarchy, proxied by layers, we now consider
the width of the hierarchy, the second variable that denes the hierarchys structure, measured
by the span of control of managers. We dene the span of control in each layer as the employment
ratio between two adjacent layers. Specically, the span of control of managers is dened as
the number of employees in the layer below per manager. In Table 7, we present results for the
e¤ects of the policy on the span of control of each layer. Columns (1) and (2) report the e¤ect
for top managersspan of control (layer 3 of the hierarchy); columns (3) and (4) present the
e¤ects on the span of control of middle managers (layer 2), and columns (5) and (6) for workers
in layer 1. We include di¤erent sets of xed e¤ects, as above. The top panel is for the sample of
all rms, and shows that rms increased the span of control of top managers in response to the
reform, by a signicant 0.036, implying an average increase of around 2% within rms, relative
to the sample mean.
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Table 7: Competition and average span of control
Dependent variable: average span of control
Layer: Top managers Middle managers Higher-skilled
(Layer 3) (Layer 2) (Layer 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All rms
OTSF reform 0.036** 0.044** 0.039 0.155*** 0.036 0.104*
(0.016) (0.018) (0.046) (0.042) (0.050) (0.060)
R2 0.000 0.044 0.001 0.027 0.004 0.145
No. obs. 639,439 639,439 342,325 342,325 330,902 330,902
Layers pre-reform = 2
OTSF reform -0.310*** -0.231*** -0.239*** -0.056 -0.063 0.501***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.048) (0.051) (0.056) (0.089)
R2 0.005 0.079 0.006 0.131 0.002 0.089
No. obs. 216,281 216,281 80,636 80,636 63,261 63,261
Layers pre-reform = 3
OTSF reform 0.383*** 0.434*** -0.194*** -0.007 0.091 0.464***
(0.047) (0.050) (0.069) (0.079) (0.059) (0.102)
R2 0.005 0.029 0.004 0.088 0.006 0.168
No. obs. 114,104 114,104 74,376 74,376 91,935 91,935
Layers pre-reform = 4
OTSF reform 0.275*** 0.263*** 0.436*** 0.467*** 0.041 0.020
(0.050) (0.048) (0.079) (0.080) (0.116) (0.132)
R2 0.001 0.042 0.003 0.037 0.006 0.153
No. obs. 69,936 69,936 67,293 67,293 67,867 67,867
The dependent variable is the average span of control of each layer in the rm, dened as the number of
employees in the layer below per employee in a layer, e.g. the span of control of top managers (layer 3) is
the number of employees in the layer below per top manager. The OTSF variable is lagged one year. Odd-
number columns include rm and year xed e¤ects and even-number columns include industry, municipality and
year xed e¤ects. Other covariates include whether the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-establishment,
ownership, and age. Observations are at the rm-year level. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality,
are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
The pooled di¤erence-in-di¤erences results in Table 7 report average estimates after the
policy change. In Figures 5 and 6, we present event studies for the e¤ect of the policy on the
span of control of top managers and middle managers, respectively. As above, the gures plot
the estimated coe¢ cients over time, relative to t  1 as the reference year, and 95% condence
bands. The e¤ect on the span of control of top managers (Figure 5) is insignicant prior to
the reform, conrming that there are no pretends, and it becomes positive and statistically
signicant after the policy change. The coe¢ cients also increase over time, with the duration
of the program and the increase in rm entry. Importantly, the timing is also consistent with
the e¤ects on rm entry and the number of hierarchy layers, reported in Figures 3 and 4 above.
The event study evidence for middle managersspan of control, presented in Figure 6, is similar,
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Figure 6: E¤ect of the On the Spot Firmprogram on middle managersspan of control over
time
The subsequent three panels of Table 7 present results for samples of rms according to
the initial number of layers. We nd that rms with three and four layers prior to the reform
are the ones that increase the span of control of managers in response to the increase in rm
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entry, consistent with the results for the number of layers. In particular, the estimates imply an
increase of 18% and 12% in the span of control of top managers, for rms with three and four
layers, respectively, relative to average span in the samples. We nd that rms with initially
four layers also increase the span of control of middle managers, but the coe¢ cient is negative
for the other samples.
In sum, the results above show that in response to the competition shock, rms change the
structure of their hierarchy, reducing its depth and increasing the span of control of experts,
relative to rms in municipalities una¤ected by the policy.
Table 8: Competition and top-bottom-layer pay inequality
Dependent variable: Top-bottom-layer pay ratio
Sample: All rms Reduce layers Do not reduce layers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Firms
OTSF reform -0.033** -0.105*** -0.156*** -0.181*** 0.079*** -0.036***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.036) (0.033) (0.019) (0.012)
R2 0.000 0.076 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.132
No. obs. 759,990 759,990 111,668 111,668 648,322 648,322
Layers pre-reform = 2
OTSF reform -0.084*** -0.116*** -0.190*** -0.192*** 0.025 0.013
(0.024) (0.021) (0.040) (0.035) (0.032) (0.029)
R2 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.018 0.003 0.030
No. obs. 150,265 150,265 57,871 57,871 92,394 92,394
Layers pre-reform = 3
OTSF reform -0.031 -0.072*** -0.058 -0.113*** 0.028 0.033
(0.027) (0.022) (0.043) (0.036) (0.044) (0.040)
r2 0.001 0.044 0.004 0.043 0.003 0.047
No. obs. 78,114 78,114 34,025 34,025 44,089 44,089
Layers pre-reform = 4
OTSF reform -0.099*** -0.151*** -0.231** -0.295*** 0.005 -0.019
(0.037) (0.043) (0.095) (0.096) (0.040) (0.058)
R2 0.002 0.069 0.004 0.048 0.004 0.079
No. obs. 56,142 56,142 19,772 19,772 36,370 36,370
The dependent variable is the ratio of average hourly pay in the top layer in the rm to average pay in the bottom
layer. The OTSF variable is lagged one year. Columns (1)-(2) are for all rms, columns (3)-(4) are for the sample of
rms which drop layers after the reform, while columns (5)-(6) are for the sample of rms which do not drop layers.
Odd-number columns include rm and year xed e¤ects and even-number columns include industry, municipality
and year xed e¤ects. Other covariates include whether the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-establishment,
ownership, and age. Observations are at the rm-year level. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, are
reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Next, we investigate the e¤ects of the reform on wage inequality. We estimate Equation
(3) for measures of wage inequality as dependent variables. To construct a measure of pay
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inequality at the rm-level, which is closely linked to the theory, we focus on top-bottompay
ratios, comparing average pay in the highest hierarchy level of the rm with average pay in
the lowest level (see also Mueller et al., 2017 and Friedrich, 2020). We also use the standard
deviation of hourly pay as a measure of dispersion, as well as the 90-10 and 90-50 hourly pay
percentile ratios, to measure changes in the pay distribution.
Table 8 presents the results for the top-bottom layer pay inequality measure. Columns (1)
and (2) use the full sample of rms. We nd that the reform is associated with a decrease in the
gap between average pay in the top and the bottom layer within rms in a¤ected municipalities
(column 1) as well as across rms in an industry, controlling for municipalities unobserved
heterogeneity (column 2). The e¤ects are negative and statistically signicant for the full
sample, in the top panel, as well as for samples according to rmsinitial number of layers, in
subsequent panels. The estimates for the full sample imply a 2% to 7% reduction in the top-
bottom pay ratio, relative to the mean in the sample. This nding shows that the delayering
following the competition shock, discussed above, is accompanied by a signicant reduction in
within-rm wage inequality. For example, eliminating a top-management layer could reduce the
wage gap between managers and workers. The rm can also change the number of production
workers. Thus, compositional changes are important in explaining changes in inequality.
To conrm whether the reduction in wage inequality arises through changes in organizational
structure induced by the policy, we estimate the e¤ects separately for rms that reduce and for
those that do not reduce the number of layers. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 report results for
the sample of rms that drop layers after the reform, while columns (5) and (6) report results
for rms that do not drop layers. We nd that the reduction in pay inequality within rms is
observed only for rms that reduce the number of layers. The coe¢ cient on the reform variable
is negative and highly signicant for the sample of all rms, as well as by initial layers. In
particular, rms that reduce hierarchical layers experience a 10 to 12% average decrease in the
top-bottom pay ratio after the reform (top panel). This e¤ect is of a larger magnitude than the
estimates in columns (1) and (2), for all rms. The e¤ects are insignicant for rms that do
not reduce the number of layers, with an exception for the sample of all rms, but only when
rm xed e¤ects are not included. These ndings suggest that the reduction in inequality arises
through rm restructuring, induced by the reform, as predicted by the theory, rather than as a
direct e¤ect of the deregulation.
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Table 9: Competition and pay inequality measures
sd(hourly pay) 90-10 pay ratio 90-50 pay ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All rms
OTSF reform -0.255*** -0.303*** -0.154*** -0.183*** -0.078*** -0.097***
(0.083) (0.072) (0.034) (0.035) (0.020) (0.018)
r2 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.011
N 96,189 96,189 111,668 111,668 111,668 111,668
Layers pre-reform = 2
OTSF reform -0.342** -0.319*** -0.197*** -0.205*** -0.118*** -0.124***
(0.142) (0.091) (0.048) (0.048) (0.035) (0.031)
r2 0.000 0.026 0.001 0.019 0.000 0.017
N 44,306 44,306 57,871 57,871 57,871 57,871
Layers pre-reform = 3
OTSF reform -0.060 -0.173** -0.070 -0.137*** -0.022 -0.060*
(0.096) (0.081) (0.058) (0.044) (0.043) (0.034)
r2 0.003 0.062 0.002 0.030 0.002 0.021
N 32,399 32,399 34,025 34,025 34,025 34,025
Layers pre-reform = 4
OTSF reform -0.412 -0.632** -0.172 -0.239 -0.057 -0.099**
(0.316) (0.273) (0.156) (0.148) (0.048) (0.047)
r2 0.001 0.040 0.001 0.011 0.002 0.021
N 19,484 19,484 19,772 19,772 19,772 19,772
The OTSF variable is lagged one year. The regressions are for the sample of rms that drop layers after the reform.
Odd-number columns include rm and year xed e¤ects and even-number columns include industry, municipality
and year xed e¤ects. Other covariates include whether the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-establishment,
ownership, and age. Observations are at the rm-year level. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, are
reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table 9 uses as alternative measures of pay inequality the standard deviation of real hourly
pay as well as the 90-10 and 90-50 percentile ratios of pay. These measures assess whether there
are changes in the overall dispersion and in the pay distribution. The table reports results for
the sample of rms that reduce the number of layers after the policy change. We nd that
the standard deviation of hourly pay decreases by 13% after the reform within a¤ected rms,
relative to the sample standard deviation (column 1); there is also a reduction across rms in
a¤ected municipalities (column 2). The results in columns (3) to (6) show that the reform is
also associated with a decrease in the 90-10 and 90-50 pay gaps. The estimate in column (3)
implies a 9% drop in the 90-10 percentile pay ratio within rms, similar to the e¤ect estimated
above for the top-bottom-layer pay ratio. Delayering is also accompanied by a decrease in the
90-50 gap of 0.078, corresponding to 5.6% of the sample average ratio. The magnitude of the
decrease is thus larger for the 90-10 wage gap, suggesting that the drop in inequality is larger
between workers at the top and those at the bottom of the rm than between workers at the
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top and those in the middle of the distribution.
Table A.2 in the Appendix reports results for the same specications as Table 9 but for the
sample of rms that do not reduce layers. As shown, the coe¢ cients are insignicant for the
samples by initial layers, while they are positive and signicant for the full sample of rms when
rm and year xed e¤ects are included. Therefore, the reduction in within-rm inequality arises
through restructuring following the competition shock, consistent with the previous results.
The evidence presented in this section, that dropping a layer is accompanied by a reduction
in inequality within rms, is consistent with knowledge-based and incentive-based hierarchy
theories, where reducing the number of layers a¤ects wage inequality due to changing skill
requirements and incentives (e.g., Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Chen, 2017). In partic-
ular, knowledge-based theories predict that if rms contract by dropping a management layer,
more problems are solved at each layer, since there is less problem-solving assistance from a
higher layer. Therefore, the knowledge or skill requirement of each layer increases, reducing pay
inequality between managers and workers.
6.4 Worker-level outcomes
The matched employer-employee data that we use allows to also estimate individual-level out-
comes. This assesses in more detail how rms reorganize and how reorganization a¤ects workers
pay and career transitions. We estimate the e¤ects on individual wages, as well as the probab-
ility of demotion, promotion and exit for workers in rms a¤ected by the policy, according to
the layer of the worker in the year prior to the reform.
We start by estimating Equation (4), for the log of real hourly pay at the worker level, as the
dependent variable. We control for each workers observable characteristics: education, age and
tenure and their squares, gender, and type of employment contract, and for rm characteristics:
size, age, ownership, whether the rm is an exporter or multi-plant. We include sets of xed
e¤ects as described in Section 5; in particular, individual xed e¤ects control for workers
unobservable skills and ability. The results are presented in Table 10. We nd that the pay
of individuals in layers 3 and 2 prior to the reform (top and middle managers) in a¤ected
municipalities increases following the policy change. In particular, the estimates imply that
managerial pay increases on average by 2% (column 1). The results are the same when we
include worker-rm match xed e¤ects, thus estimating the e¤ect of the policy from workers
that remain in the same rm after the reform, rather than also from those that move to other
rms (column 2).
The increase in managerial pay is consistent with the higher spans of control of managers
reported in the previous section; with higher managerial span of control, managerswages are
expected to increase. Increased managerial pay at the individual-level also suggests that the
attening of the rm is accompanied by increased decision-making by managers, consistent with
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evidence of the link between incentive provision and decision-making authority (e.g. Athey and
Roberts, 2001; Prendergast, 2002; Rosen, 1982). The pay of production workers, in the lowest
hierarchy layer, also increases, consistent with increased problem solving when rms reorganize
by dropping a hierarchy layer.
Table 10: Competition and worker-level compensation
Dependent variable: ln(hourly pay)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OTSFlayerpre-reform=3 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.014*** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
OTSFlayerpre-reform=2 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
OTSFlayerpre-reform=1 0.001 0.001 -0.002** -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
OTSFlayerpre-reform=0 0.004** 0.004** 0.001*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Worker xed e¤ects yes
Match xed e¤ects yes
Municipality Fixed e¤ects yes yes
Industry Fixed e¤ects yes yes
Firm xed e¤ects yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
R2 0.046 0.044 0.448 0.619
No. obs. 4,920,508 4,920,508 4,920,508 4,920,508
The OTSF variable is lagged one year. layerpre-reform is the hierarchy layer of the worker
in the year prior to the adoption of the reform. The regressions consider all pre-reform
years and two post-reform years. Other covariates include, at the worker-level: tenure and
its square, education, type of contract of employment, whether part-time worker; at the
rm-level: log of size, whether the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-establishment,
ownership, and age. All regresions also include indicators for the workerslayer in the year
prior to the reform. Robust standard errors, clustered by rm in parentheses. Observations
are at the worker-year level. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
The worker-level results in this section estimate the e¤ects of the reform controlling for
observable and unobservable worker skills; and are therefore not reective of heterogeneous
workersskill di¤erences. The results in the previous section, of a reduction in pay inequality at
the rm-level, on the other hand, capture the role of worker skills, consistent with knowledge-
based hierarchy predictions that dropping layers changes skill requirements across layers.
Next, we measure the e¤ect on individuals probability of demotion, promotion and exit
from the rm. Demotion is dened as a move to a lower layer, while promotion is a move to
a higher layer. We estimate linear probability models for each of those outcomes, conditional
on the layer a worker was in prior to the reform. We control for the same worker and rm
observable characteristics as above.
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Table 11: Competition and worker-level outcomes
Pr(exit) Pr(demotion) Pr(promotion)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OTSFlayerpre-reform=3 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.021*** -0.025*** -0.027***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
OTSFlayerpre-reform=2 0.013*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.048*** -0.047***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
OTSFlayerpre-reform=1 0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.044*** -0.046***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
OTSFlayerpre-reform=0 0.030*** 0.001** -0.000 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Firm xed e¤ects yes yes
Municipality Fixed e¤ects yes yes yes
Industry Fixed e¤ects yes yes yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.058 0.010 0.022 0.014 0.029
No. obs. 5,119,994 4,490,578 4,490,578 4,490,578 4,490,578
The OTSF variable is lagged one year. layerpre-reform is the hierarchy layer of the worker in the year
prior to the adoption of the reform. The regressions consider all pre-reform years and two post-reform
years. Pr(exit) takes the value of one if the worker is in the rm for the last time in the current period.
Demotion (promotion) is dened as a lower (higher) layer than in the previous period. Other covariates
include, at the worker-level: tenure and its square, education, type of contract of employment, whether
part-time worker; at the rm-level: log of size, whether the rm is an exporter, whether it is multi-
establishment, ownership, and age. All regresions also include indicators for the workerslayer in the year
prior to the reform. The regressions are are linear probability models. Robust standard errors, clustered
by rm in parentheses. Observations are at the worker-year level. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
The results are reported in Table 11. In column (1), we nd that across all layers workers
are more likely to exit the a¤ected rms after the reform, by 1 to 3 percentage points, depending
on the layer of the worker prior to the reform. Workers in lower layers have a higher probability
of exit. Columns (2) and (3) report results for the probability of demotion. The coe¢ cients on
the interaction terms between the reform variable and the indicators for the pre-reform layer of
the worker show that top managers (layer 3) are more likely to be demoted, e.g. to a position in
the middle-manager layer, after the reform. This is observed both within the same rm (column
2) and across rms (column 3). However, workers in layers 2 and 1 have a lower probability of
demotion. In columns (5) and (6), we also nd that workers are less likely to be promoted after
the reform, in the same or in another rm, with the exception of those in layer 0.
The results in this section show that the decision of rms to reorganize following the com-
petition shock a¤ects workerspay and career trajectories. In particular, workers are more likely
to exit the rm and less likely to be promoted, within or across rms. While individuals in top
management are also more likely to be demoted. The increased competition and the attening




This paper investigates the e¤ect of increased domestic product market competition, on rms
internal organization and wage inequality. We investigate the e¤ect of entry deregulation on
the structure of a rms hierarchy, measured by the number of layers and the average span of
control of managers. We then study how these changes a¤ect the distribution of wages within
the rm and wage inequality. An important contribution of our paper is to identify a causal
link between changes in competition in the domestic product market and rmsorganizational
change and wage inequality. To do that, we exploit the On the Spot Firmprogram, a unique
episode of rm entry deregulation, implemented in Portugal from 2005, as a natural experiment.
Our identication strategy uses the roll out of the program across municipalities over time as an
exogenous source of increased entry and competition. We use uniquely detailed linked employer-
employee data for the universe of private sector rms and all of their workers.
We show that the reform signicantly increased rm entry within industries and municipal-
ities. The increased rm entry following the policy change is associated with lower rm sales,
output and employment within rms. In both knowledge-based and incentive-based hierarchy
models, the optimal hierarchical structure is related to rm production scale. Consistent with
theoretical results, we nd that a¤ected rms respond to the shock by reducing the number of
hierarchy layers and increasing the spans of control of managers.
The attening of the rm following the reform is accompanied by a reduction in pay in-
equality within rms and across rms. Firms that drop layers experience a signicant reduction
in inequality between workers in the top and those in the bottom layer of the hierarchy. The
magnitude of the e¤ect is estimated at a 10% reduction on average in the top-bottom pay ratio
after the reform. We also nd that the standard deviation and the 90-10 and 90-50 percent-
ile pay ratios decrease for a¤ected rms. These ndings are consistent with knowledge-based
and incentive-based hierarchy theories, that reducing the number of layers a¤ects the wage
distribution and inequality as workersskill composition and incentives change.
The matched employer-employee data also allows us to estimate worker-level outcomes. We
nd that workers are more likely to exit the rm and less likely to be promoted, within or across
rms. Top managers are more likely to be demoted, e.g., to a position in the middle-manager
layer. The e¤ects of the reform and the attening of rmshierarchies, can therefore have lasting
consequences on the pay and career progression of individual workers.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Classication of workers according to skill levels
Level Tasks Skills
1. Top executives (top man-
agement)
Denition of the rm general
policy or consulting on the or-
ganization of the rm; stra-
tegic planning; creation or ad-
aptation of technical, scientic
and administrative methods or
processes
Knowledge of management
and coordination of rms
fundamental activities; know-
ledge of management and
coordination of the funda-
mental activities in the eld
to which the individual is
assigned and that requires the






of the guidelines established
by the superiors and directly





3. Supervisors, team leaders Orientation of teams, as direc-
ted by the superiors, but re-
quiring the knowledge of ac-
tion processes
Complete professional qualic-
ation with a specialization
4. Higher-skilled professionals Tasks requiring a high tech-
nical value and dened in gen-
eral terms by the superiors
Complete professional quali-
cation with a specialization
adding to theoretical and ap-
plied knowledge
5. Skilled professionals Complex or delicate tasks,
usually not repetitive, and
dened by the superiors
Complete professional qualic-
ation implying theoretical and
applied knowledge
6. Semi-skilled professionals Well dened tasks, mainly
manual or mechanical (no in-
tellectual work) with low com-
plexity, usually routine and
sometimes repetitive
Professional qualication in a
limited eld or practical and
elementary professional know-
ledge
7. Non-skilled professionals Simple tasks and totally de-
termined
Practical knowledge and easily
acquired in a short time
8. Apprentices, interns, train-
ees
Apprenticeship
Note: Hierarchical levels dened according to Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd (Source: Lima and Pereira, 2003).
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Table A.2: Competition and pay inequality measures, rms that do not drop layers
sd(hourly pay) 90-10 pay ratio 90-50 pay ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All rms
OTSF reform 0.110* -0.043 0.073** -0.062*** 0.050** -0.029*
(0.059) (0.038) (0.034) (0.024) (0.024) (0.015)
R2 0.001 0.053 0.001 0.049 0.001 0.038
No. obs. 437,980 437,980 648,322 648,322 648,322 648,322
Layers pre-reform = 2
OTSF reform 0.050 0.062 0.026 0.019 0.023 0.013
(0.102) (0.083) (0.075) (0.066) (0.055) (0.048)
R2 0.002 0.037 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.009
No. obs. 88,359 88,359 92,394 92,394 92,394 92,394
Layers pre-reform = 3
OTSF reform 0.091 0.118 -0.038 -0.024 -0.032 -0.024
(0.087) (0.107) (0.058) (0.066) (0.029) (0.031)
R2 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.010
No. obs. 43,781 43,781 44,089 44,089 44,089 44,089
Layers pre-reform = 4
OTSF reform 0.034 0.006 -0.035 -0.033 0.008 0.004
(0.127) (0.133) (0.033) (0.036) (0.014) (0.015)
R2 0.001 0.027 0.001 0.040 0.004 0.053
No. obs. 36,321 36,321 36,370 36,370 36,370 36,370
The OTSF variable is lagged one year. Regressions are for the sample of rms that drop layers after
the reform. Odd-number columns include rm and year xed e¤ects and even-number columns include
industry, municipality and year xed e¤ects. Other covariates include whether the rm is an exporter,
whether it is multi-establishment, ownership, and age. Observations are at the rm-year level. Robust
standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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